Friday, August 21, 2015

Viacom (VIA) : The Terrible Truth: Management IS the Problem

Hasn't the plot thickened with this collapse in the Viacom’s share price? The terrible truth at the heart of this story is that management is the problem-not the cable industry nor the company’s beleaguered brands. 

Large declines in revenues are based on fundamental declines in viewing and advertising. Is there one single reason? No, audiences are fragmenting, time shifting, using a variety of devices. What is interesting is that only about $140 million of the national TV $1.1 bn decline is drawn from cable TV,  the Viacom nets seem to be underperforming even within this secular trend. 
  •  All VIA nets are down and the declines are not simply a measurement issue as management claims.  MTV has totally lost its way and even stalwart Kids programmer, Nickelodeon, has not had a hit show in 15 years- since Sponge Bob and Dora the Explorer. Comedy Central has managed to lose its two biggest names, Stephen Colbert and John Stewart in six months. Really? How do you let that happen if you are a major league content provider?
  • Viacom management, like other cable content producers (vis TWX) doesn’t get the fundamental nature of the industry change. Stock buy backs, really? Revenue growth by jacking up affiliate fees (approx 1/2 media network revenues), when cable affiliates Cable One and Suddenlink (amounting to 2 million) have dropped the company’s services? Really? This is not an option anymore. (BTW, higher basic rates also damage premium services because subscribers have to buy through basic services to get them. Isn’t this the missing argument for HBO GO?)
  • With the loss of two million net subscribers from affiliate rolls, BOTH advertising and affiliate fees will take a hit-even if the ad market improves!  By our estimate a 10% decline in advertising revenue will lead to a 13% decline in EBITDA- assuming no increase in program spending to stem the tide of viewer losses. A loss of two million subscribers from affiliate rolls will harm EBITDA by $20 million, which, though not as big as blow as continued  advertising erosion will reduce affiliate fee growth to flat. And of course eliminate 2 million potential viewers.  
  • In this quarter as in past quarters, Viacom EBITDA was flat down and free cash flow declined by (30%) to $380 million while debt to over $13bn from $12.7bn and cash declined by $600 million. 
  • One the plus side, MTV, Nick, and Comedy Central still have strong brand identification (even if  management has milked them dry). And, in current quarter, big ratings for Jon Stewart’s last appearances on the Daily Show, could offset some ratings declines but these are likely to re-accelerate, once he leaves the anchor chair. At the same time, Paramount has two big releases this quarter- MI 5 and Minority Report which will boost moribund Entertainment revenues.  
  • Conclusion:  Somebody Please Put VIA OUT of Its Misery. While Viacom’s assets and brands still have appeal to target audiences they are being wasted. Management is the problem and yet management has been paying itself -exorbitantly- with so called equity compensation, (Dauman $37 million !! and Dooley $34 million respectively last year!)  The stock had stabilized in the high sixties on financially unsupportable share repurchases. But these are not an option given the declines in EBITDA and increases in debt. Redstone can’t provide adult oversight any more and, besides, has been selling shares for estate tax purposes. Somebody has to put Viacom out of its misery.  
  • CBS, which was supposed to be the slow growth, cash cow in the Viacom break-up plan, has capitalized on retransmission fees and Showtime’s strength to outpace the sleeker growth oriented Viacom and embarrass the Dauman/Dooley team. Clearly, as a Redstone owned business, CBS's CEO LEs Moonves would likely get the first call from Redstone family to rescue Viacom. But who knows whether Moonves/CBS has the appetite and whether Dauman would demand too much if Moonves were to take over. 
  • As an alternative, Malone could-should form a coalition of the willing-which would include Charter, Lions Gate, Starz/ Encore and Liberty Broadband. Paramount-LionsGate is a perfect fit. Both companies know reach other well. Lionsgate/Paramount would be a killer combination of studio and library, (which would also benefit from a shift to lower Canadian tax rates, while STARZ/Encore would add the MTV Networks, Nickelodeon,  Comedy Central and ePix. 

Friday, January 16, 2015

Put Viacom and CBS Back Together, The Way They Were Supposed To Be.

Why In God's Name Did I Buy Viacom? 

Recently, I bought some Viacom. Not a lot, some. 
Hmmmm. Probably an impulse buy, which means probably a mistake. I bought the stock because it is cheap at 12 times consensus estimates of $5.85 p.s. in 2015, though negative revisions would not surprise me.

And, it seems to me that it should be part of another company.  Except for Paramount Pictures, Viacom is almost exclusively in the cable network business. As such, it is vulnerable to continuing ratings and ad revenues declines.  In addition, it is strategically too small to defend itself from strategic choices that its cable operator affiliates are going to make.

It has other problems-not a few of which could sink the shares. But, the optimist in me says, hold on this is Viacom, the flagship that Sumner Redstone used to build a great media empire. It's a great cash machine and it is buying back between $2 and $3 billion of shares and cutting dividend checks for $500 million.

Cable networking was supposed to grow at double digit rates ad infinitum. It hasn’t. And Viacom’s networks skewed to teens and younger and were supposed to grow even faster.  They haven't. In fact, MTV Networks has been a ratings disaster.

Ok, so why are you buying? It is my hypothesis, (hope-fantasy?) that the Redstone family will decide, soon,  that Viacom and CBS need to be consolidated. If an all stock deal - for arguments sake - were executed at say a 50% premium to the current price, the combined company would have the scale, scope, and capitalization that it needs to compete with the other players in the media industry. 

The Way It Was Supposed To Work

The way it was supposed to work when CBS was acquired by Viacom and then was subsequently spun off (after some reshuffling of assets ) is that remaining Viacom-composed principally of cable networks and Paramount-was supposed to be the growth story and CBS was supposed to be the mature cash cow. Well that's not how it worked out. As it turned out the growth story turned out to be the cow and the cow the growth story. Over the last four years, CBS comparisons with VIA dramatically favor CBS:

CBS vs Viacom: Comparison of 4yr Compound Average Growth rates
bp Advantage
Operating Cash Flow
Dividend Growth
Shares O/S
10 turns
Source, company financial reports

None of this makes any sense. Starting from the bottom up: even a year ago Viacom  traded at a premium to the S&P and to CBS. Now it trades almost 10 full multiple turns below CBS. Not the way it should trade. Both companies have share buy backs programs but VIA has reduced share count more. Not what was expected for a growth story. CBS's operating cash flow has grown at an impressive 12.16% over the last four years  while growth at Viacom has been a modest 2.44%. Sales are up modestly at CBS-to be expected, right; after all it is supposedly the mature business but VIA sales are down? Not expected. VIA were supposed to grow at double digit rates long into the future. Cable net ratings were supposed to take additional share away from Broadcast dealing a crushing blow and affiliate fees were supposed to be a consistent stream that never went into reverse. What happened is that the cable networks relied too heavily on a continuous upward trajectory in affiliate fees. Ratings have collapsed and cable operator affiliates have begun bailing out.
As the Journal wrote recently:
  •  "Viacom is known for its aggressive bundling of two dozen channels, including little-watched spinoffs of MTV, VH1, Nickelodeon and CMT. 
  • A group of 60 cable operators representing about 900,000 subscribers dropped Viacom channels entirely this summer. In September, carriage negotiations broke off with Suddenlink, the nation’s seventh-largest operator, representing 1.4 million customers. 
Viacom’s standoff in the sticks is seen as an example of operators starting to push back at the channel bouquets that top programmers were able to develop in more advantageous times."

There seems to be a revolt breaking out all over the cable business. Cable operators are taking up arms against ever increasing network affiate fees. It is noteworthy that the worst offender/culprit is not the Viacom group of networks but rather ESPN, which charges operators almost $8 per month. Add on the Broadcast networks, whose retransmission fees have risen in the mid single digit range consistently, and smaller programming "bouquets" like Viacom will be squeezed out.  Still, as Matt Harrigan points out (Wunderlich Securities Nov 14, 2014)  over 70% of Viacom's households are covered by 3 year contracts. And, further that Viacom's affiliate fee growth is not much higher than the double digit increases that are the norm. And again as Matt points out the MTV networks are important to new and old entrants in the content world. It's just that Viacom seems to have lost it's creative energy and is being surpassed by other networks in commitment to exciting original programming.  And it is easy to drop networks like those owned by Viacom if they are perceived as losing energy.

Ok, you argue the cable network business has not performed as expected. Ratings and ad rates have been down. Across the board! Yes, some networks are down. But others are up, Here are fourth quarter numbers from MediaPost.

"Fox networks grew 5% to 858,000, with virtually all other cable network groups sinking — the worst coming with A&E down 20% to 887,000. Also in double-digit declines was Viacom, off 18% to 2.18 million; NBCU, losing 15% to 1.3 million; and AMC Networks, down 11% to 438,000".
Here below full year rankings. While Nick leads all networks in total day, and Comedy and MTV are 24th and 25th in primetime,  it is hard to find other Viacom Networks on the list.


Ranked on Total Viewers

Rank Primetime Total Day
Net (000) Net (000)
1 ESPN 2276 NICK 1606
2 USA 2179 DSNY 1396
3 TNT 2039 ADSM* 1238
4 DSNY 1943 USA 1150
5 TBSC 1869 TOON 1067
6 HIST 1857 FOXN 1055
7 FOXN 1732 TNT 1049
8 FX 1447 ESPN 1016
9 DISC 1414 NAN * 968
10 AMC 1355 HIST 863
11 HGTV 1343 HGTV 761
12 ADSM 1341 TBSC 712
13 NAN 1313 AEN 709
14 AEN 1269 FX 675
15 FAM 1259 ID 632
16 LIF 1132 DISC 628
17 SYFY 1131 AMC 626
18 FOOD 1087 FOOD 595
19 TLC 1079 FAM 579
20 BRAV 991 LIF 529
21 HALL 909 HALL 525
22 SPK 903 SPK 503
23 ID 811 TVLD 500
24 MTV 783 TLC 496
25 CMDY 705 DSJR 480
* Network broadcasts less than 51% of minutes in a 24-hour day.

Source: Turner Research from Nielsen data

By contrast, CBS is having a terrifiic ratings year. Last week its on-going series captured 16 of the top 25 rated shows. NCIS, Mom, Big Bang, Madam Secretary, The Good Wife, Scorpion-all shows are a mix of new and returning as well. Improvements are happening across the board. At the same time they are all owned shows whose current success on the network will translate into significant future revenues.

Ranked on Households

Week Jan. 4
NetworkHouseholdsPeople 2+Adults 18-49
*Each rating point is equivalent to 1 percent or 1.164 million homes
Note: Viewing estimates include same day (3 a.m.-3 a.m.) DVR playback.
Source: Nielsen

What Can Viacom Do? 
Viacom's fourth quarter conference call was almost exclusively devoted to why the significant declines in ratings do not reflect the real value to consumers of Viacom Networks. Yet, in my view, owners of the shares need to accept that the only ratings issues at work here are those that come from a lack of viewers and a lack of interest.

The company is currently talking to Neilsen and other ratings companies abouut ratings issues. Secondly, the company is attemptng to create an industry wide standard for capturing viewing on non cable outlets - digital, OTT- whatever. Dauman has been talking to Rentrak and others about alternatives to Neilsen. Some day soon, I believe, the ratings measurement companies will add capability although I don't have a clue how that might be done. My concern is that Viacom's numbers will be less than Dauman hopes as online takes an ever larger share of the ad market.

Recognizing the need to untether itself from ratings measurement, Viacom says that 30% of its ad revenues do not originate from Neilson rated shows. Still, there will be no real way to immunize ad sales from a lack of excitment and creativity in the product itself, which is where I believe the real problem lies.

In my view, the only way to revitalize these networks is to bring in new management and to bolt them on to a sizable company with far more market clout. Pounding away at ever higher affiliate fees in the face of lower interest on the part of viewers and subscribers is bad for everybody in the cable industry. At the moment, networks can get away with it. But there will come a day...

There is a better way. The Way It Was Supposed to Be. 

The better way is to put CBS and Viacom back together. The recombined entity will have the cash generating capacity of the two separate entities plus a lot more in my view. 

Here’s what the combined entity would have looked if merged last year with a 50% premium. It will have sales of almost $30 billion. The compound growth rate in sales is not impressive and reflects weak conditions (particularly in auto co advertising) this year and last year projected into the future.

CBS Exchange Offer For Viacom: 50% Premium
Combined Enterprise Value of
$88 billion
Combined Company
EV Mulitple of 
$29 billion 3.03 times .060%
Operating Cash Flow $7.33 billion 12.01 7.59%
Operating Cash Flow
$8.0 billion 11.0 6.41%
Net Debt
$18.55 billion

Net Debt to OCF

Source, company financial reports, Macdonald estimates

Still, there is good reason for optimism.  It seems likely the Broadcast and Cable network ad market will strength. A reasonable upside would be somewhere around 5% reflecting a return to modest growth for the Viacom Netowrks and an acceleration in sales at the CBS TV network. In future years, retrans fees (and reverse comp affiate fees are schduled for sharp increase in 2016. Even without any cross platform benefits, EDITDA should grow at mid to high single digits. Most of this growth will come from CBS. If Dauman is successful in piquing interest in non traditional measurement then the number would be even higher.

The above are advertising climate considerations but here below are further strategic benefits that are low hanging fruit that I see for the combination.

Here are the eight basic upsides we see for a potential combination.   
  1. Increased scale and scope for the entire CBS Entertainment complex. MTV and CBS would enhance each others offering to both advertisers and affiliates. Today Viacom Networks/Paramount (and to a much lesser degree CBS)  do not have the leverage with advertisers up that Comcast, 21st Century Fox and Disney enjoy.  Viacom/CBS would have scale that would be hard to ignore. 
  2. MTV would certainly gain from CBS success with advertisers and CBS would gain from MTV’s brand as a youth oriented programmer
  3. Internationally, MTV Networks could help CBS with local identities (MTV is local in many countries) and sales organizations. CBS could help MTV (and Paramount) with strong product offerings from its television production studio
  4. Increased scope and scale for Paramount. Instead of being an after thought, Paramount would be bolted onto to a very strong network TV production arm and be back in the syndication business. While it would not necessary have access to more capital, it would benefit from increased scale and scope and probably gain creative energy from the association with CBS Production.  
  5. CBS management has more creative energy than Viacom and its transformation from an agent and buyer of programming to a creator and owner is both impressive and likely to continue. While the creator-owner strategy is the Viacom business model, it has  seeded its creator position to younger, online competitors like Vice Media as it focused on share repurchase and returning capital to shareholders.
  6. With Paramount in the mix as well the company could create a killer digital strategy as well. Both companies are developing a portfolio of sites, though MTV managed to let Vice Media-charge ahead in a niche that should have been dominated by Viacom. 
  7. Finally, a lower risk profile in the portfolio of businesses owned by National Amusements. Without the expected benefit from shining a light on NAI’s supposedly fast growing Cable Networks, it seems inefficient to have two management teams working in two separate public silos when only one-CBS's management-is needed.

Friday, November 21, 2014

A Loss To Consumers and To The Media Environment

An Open Letter To Chet Kanojia

Dear Chet,


Your being forced into taking the inevitable step of filing for Chapter 11 is a true loss to the media industry. The average consumer- average american (!) will not lose the robust choice which Aereo had created. A shame.

Though we have never met, I have followed you and your colleagues and been impressed with the grace and thoughtfulness which you have carried yourselves at every step of the way. As a media analyst, I feel the loss of Aereo even more acutely because enterpreneurism is desperately need in our industry!

All the best in whatever you do next.


Thursday, November 20, 2014

A Really Good and "Sensible" Talk on Value

This long talk but worth it. Damodaran addresses how to look at Apple, Twitter and Uber.

Best line is "Harvard Business Review is soft porn for corporate strategists".

Friday, November 14, 2014

Jimmy Rogers, Putin and My Friend Michael Waring

MY friend, Michael Waring, a very smart guy who runs Gallileo Equity copied me an interview of Jimmy Rogers by Henry Blodgett, also two very smart guys. Basically, Rogers blames the State Department (and, therefore, Edward Snowden-a pawn in somebody's geo-political economic game) for provoking Putin's aggressive stance. (Sort of falls into the category of if the guy can't take a joke f**k him.

Here's my response to Michael to a portion of the interview.

"He’s a thinker and Putin’’s a stinker! Not to be glib. I beginning to sound like my brother! I like Jimmy-he mostly makes a lot of sense. Still, I’m not quite as sure that punishing Putin with an oil shock and its attendant collateral damage to Canada and Australia and some of the friendlier Arab states at a time of intense foment, does. I agree that the oil shock offers a strategic silver lining-sanctioning Russia where it hurts most. And yet, you wonder, why Putin is forging ahead with an invasion of the Ukraine where he is bound to drain his treasury and when old revenues are weakening. Seems like a mistake. It also seems weird that Jimmy would consider Putin deranged if he invaded Germany. Wouldn't he have to invade Poland first? What does that make Poland, chopped liver? There’s a whole lot about this crack in oil that does not add up. It does NOT seem like ECONOMICS at work, but I can’t see WHAT is at work. Am I nuts. I bought some oils today. Probably way too early. Way, Way too early!"

Here's the relevant portion of the interview from Business Insider, November 14, 2014.

HB: Could the recent move in oil prices indicate a fundamental positive for the economy?

JR: It's a fundamental positive for anybody who uses oil, who uses energy. It's not a positive for places like Canada, Russia, or Australia. It seems to me that this is a bit of an artificial move. The Saudis, from what I can gather, are dumping oil because the US has told them to in order to put pressure on Russia and Iran. And it's probably not a real move. I read about shale oil like you do. But at the same time, North Sea production is declining. Russian production will start declining next year. All the major oil fields that we know about — all the production is static or declining. So it doesn't quite add up on any kind of medium-term basis I can see.

HB: You've been bullish in the last year or two on Russia, which is now going through something of a crisis. Has your view changed?

JR: No, no. I've been traveling a lot lately. I should probably try to sit down and figure out what to buy in Russia again. It has had a collapse, as you know, but I suspect if you look at things like Russian ETFs, they are down at previous lows, but not making new lows. And a lot of that is because of the ruble. To Russia's credit, Russia has not been sitting around supporting the ruble in any big way. My view of markets is you let them clean themselves out, let the system find a clearing price. To my astonishment, the Russians are being more capitalist than the Western capitalists. They are letting the currency find its own bottom. That will change soon. It will find its own bottom, and then Russia will be a good place to invest.

HB: And you say that even given Russian President Vladimir Putin and his aggressiveness?

JR: It sounds like you have been reading American propaganda too much. This all started with America, with that diplomat in Washington [Victoria Nuland, the Asst. Secretary of State]; they have her on tape. We were the ones who were very aggressive. We're the ones who said, 'We're going to overthrow this government, we don't like this government, even though it was elected. They are fools and we don't like them, so we're going to get rid of them.' We were the aggressive ones. Crimea has been part of Russia for centuries. If it weren't for [Nikita] Khrushchev getting drunk one night, it would still have been part of Russia. That election was in process, anyway. Everybody would rather be part of Russia than Ukraine. Ukraine is one of the worst-managed countries I've ever seen. Of course people want to get out of Ukraine. You would, too. It's a disaster.

Here's the whole interview.

Friday, October 24, 2014

Missing the Point on HBO and Streaming: Cable Basic Service Bundles Must Go!

OUTSIDE THE BUNDLE from the Wall Street Journal Today.

Stand-Alone Streaming Begins to Arrive.

The Journal published a summary of a la carte offerings outside the cable/ satellite eco-system. Arguably, the disintegration of cable package pricing, (inevitable frankly) has begun in earnest.

In our view, this debate has always missed the point. Cable TV is an over priced, bloated, no choive, packaged product. It is a stack of bundled services that many subscribers (and most cord cutters) do not want. The bulk of the cost of cable service is made up of retransmission charges by the major networks, and fees for "basic" cable services like ESPN and its many tentacles, and other channels in the business, family and children's categories. HBO and other premium channels can only be purchased after the subscriber has plunked down around $200 a month.

Why can't subscribers buy HBO and without having to pay for basic services first. It makes no sense (except as a legacy business practice in the early days of cable must carry). Over the last thirty years, consumers have faced a vast and expanding array of channels, but few real choices. With over 1000 channels of service on many high band-width systems, consumers generally are offered four options at most. How many consumers want multiple news services spanning the political spectrum? Most want one, the one which the voice fits best with their political outlook. How many subscribers want 20 or more sports networks? Unless you have kids, how subscribers want seven or eight children's channels? At the same time, subscriber bills have breached the $200 per month level. Put another way, consumers have been forced to pay alot for what they do not want-for years.

Our friend and former colleague Laura Martin, an analyst at Needham & Co., "estimates that unbundling would drain half of the revenue, or $70 billion, out of the television industry. Moreover, today’s hundreds of channels would shrink down to about 20, she wrote. (WSJ)" We don't think the losses will be so great, because consumers are not iirrational to the tune of $35 billion, BUT...

So-called over the top services, offer legitimate choice for far less money. Consumers will be able to express demand for what they want and only what they want.

Comcast's Steve Burke has argued that HBO needs cable because going OTT will canabalize its own subscribers. If consumers can cut out services they really don't want, then going with HBO offers tremendous savings. Taking HULU, HBO and Netflix, probably means somewhere around $100 per month savings for many consumers. That's $1200 a year. Arguably HBO subscriptions would rise if the service was not placed on top of the rest of the cable menu.

An HBO streaming service could ultimately be MORE profitable as the service will no longer have to share subscriber fees with the cable operator middle man.

What does all this mean? Video subscriptions are already falling, and we see declines in viewership of basic cable services followed by substantial shrinkage in the advertising income. We expect the program services to attempt to offset with increased subscriber fees; that will be met by heightened resistance from cable operators and consumers. Viacom services may be hit hardest, and believe that the company will not exist ten years from now. Time Warner's Turner services could also suffer without better branding and positioning online. Discovery and AMC may need to rely on strong presences foreign markets to survive, but also need to strengthen brand identity. ESPN is the tough one to predict but it will surely be vulnerable to further huge cost pressures.

Here's a link to the Journal story.

Wednesday, October 15, 2014

The Correction Is Here, US Media will Benefit from Enhanced Consumer Spending as Oil Price Declines Put Money Into Consumers Pockets.

US Trust saying that EU central banks and ECB will reverse course and expand monetary policy. Also marginal fiscal stimulus-trend of deflation in EU will end.

More important to US economy is the appearance of excess supply in the energy market. The rapid break-down in energy prices is positive because it will put more money into consumer’s pockets-it's basically a tax cut. The question is, will consumers spend the windfall at the historical marginal split of 70% increased consumer and 30% increased savings? If they do, then the economy will expand, and unemployment decline. How does sector allocation change? Presumably, the sectors which are sensitive to energy, autos, airlines and farm equipment and machinery should do well but what about utilities and railroads, where lower fuels costs might be offset by lower demand for oil transport?

Ok, what about media? Clearly, ad supported media should show positive benefits from increased consumer spending. We own Comcast Corp for NBC and its other ad-supported networks. This fits historical patterns, but technical change will disrupt direct pay sectors-like Over The Top services and or cable-even more rapidly. We own cable company shares and shares in wireless companies as an agnostic plays on the shift from fixed entertainment systems to mobile based services. We own them both domestically and internationally and see further penetration and increases in data usage as powerful secular driving forces in these sectors worldwide.

Monday, September 15, 2014

Apple Pay: An Unremarked Remarkable By Product: It's Big, So Big It Could Boost Global GDP.

Apple Pay Video

Here's something that may go unremarked, but will affect many lives. While the announcement of Apple Pay may seem big for the Tech World and Apple fans, it will have huge impacts beyond the tech world and could move the needle on on global GDP as a whole. Yup, GLOBAL! And that is not just because there is a cool new way to shop (OK yeah it is cool) but also because it is fast. Here's how fast.

The process of paying by credit or debit card can often take 30 or more seconds. The time involved, between handing over your card, its authorization, approval and signing can seem endless- not to mention sometimes also fraught with uncertainty for both merchants and consumers. You can chat up the clerk, but both they and you would rather get on with the day, right? Even after it is done, the uncertainty remains principally because credit and debit card transactions are highly insecure. With Apple Pay those uncertainties go away and the time required to make and process a payment gets cut dramatically.

All good things. But why is that going to have a global impact? In economics, the oldest of equations or (tautologies really) is that the price level times the number of transactions in any period equals the money supply times the number of times that money supply turns over - i.e the velocity of money. Going back to the invention of a money based economy, the introduction of more efficient ways to exchange money (literally to hand it over) has lead to rapid increases in productivity and wealth. Two great examples are the creation of paper money and credit cards. Both made it easier, more convenient and more secure to pay. Wealth bloomed as money turned over more quickly.

In 2008, the world economy went into a tail spin-the Great Recession. In the run up to the financial crisis, the Fed was cutting the growth of the money supply from around 3.0% to zero, while the velocity of money-the number of times per year consumers spent a dollar-was increasing from around eight and three quarter times to almost ten times. In the period before the crisis, the increasing velocity of money suggests consumer over confidence and speculation, which undermined feeble Fed attempts to restrain the economy. After the crisis began, the Fed reversed course and increased the money supply at ever faster rates hoping to stimulate the economy, but the velocity of money fell-from a turnover of nine times per year to around six and a half times. The economic bounce that the Fed expected did not materialize -at least to the extent the Fed hoped for, because the increase in money landed on a decreasing velocity of money. Here's a comparison of the velocity of money with the growth rates of GDP and Money Supply (M1-demand deposits plus cash in circulation).

So, tell me what is the big connection between Apple Pay and the velocity of money? By making payments more secure and speeding them up, Apple Pay will have a huge positive benefit on the velocity of money and therefore on GDP as a whole. In economist language, it means an increase in the money side of the economy and has the same inflationary effect as an increase in M1. Arguably, a similar increase in velocity in the mid 2000's resulted from an explosive rise in internet purchases. The impact of Apple Pay will could be even more dramatic, as it will speed up and make more secure transactions from all iPhone (and soon Apple Watch) owners. It won't happen all at once, it will require the adoption of iPhone 6 and later phones. Not doubt, Google and Amazon will figure out how to get on board with the new standard (because that is what it is) that the banks and Apple have worked out, so the leadership created by Apple Pay will lead to faster, more secure transactions throughout the economy and the world as a whole. I don't have the statistical tools to predict how much of an increase in the velocity of money will result from the introduction of Apple Pay but it will be substantial and last far into the future. So yes, pretty cool.

Friday, August 15, 2014

Media Industry Musical Chairs: Is It Over Yet?

With somewhat predictable frequency, the media, telecom and communications industries go through waves of consolidation every few years. Typically, such seismic events occur when interest rates are low, technology is changing rapidly (or even discontinuously) and valuations reach historic highs. Recently, a new wave has begun; a wave, however, unlike any in the past. The current wave involves the very biggest companies in the communications industries; and the logic behind the transactions ranges far afield from the strategic considerations of the past. This time around the landscape is also unrecognizable from prior consolidations. Broadband subscriptions are racing past video subscriptions. Advertisers will soon spend more on social media outlets than over the air broadcasters and cable networks. At the same time, video streaming services will compete on equal terms with the best programming offerings of any legacy programmer. The demand for streaming services has already out stripped the capacity of existing wired and wireless networks. The fencing matches among big players involve a great deal of thrust and parry. While we list eight deals, two have already been withdrawn: Murdoch’s offer to acquire Time Warner Inc. and Sprint’s offer to merge with T-Mobile US. In the former case, financing and resistance from TWX’s management stymied the Murdoch offer, while in the latter case, the poor prospects for passing required regulatory approval seems to have been decisive. (Whether these offers are permanently withdrawn isn’t clear, in the former case, it is possible that Time Warner could attract other bidders, while T-Mobile already has an underbid from Iliad of France.) Why all the strategic maneuvering among media players? Is this not some kind of chair shuffle on a sinking ship or is there more to it? Most importantly when will it end? Below, we lay out a table of the current media deals that have been publicly announced:





Comcast Corp

Time Warner Cable

Aggregate Cable Subscribers

Video subscriber losses in both MSOs: TWC lost almost 400K video subscriber over the last twelve months. Comcast has been losing between 130K and 150K per quarter.

21 Century Fox

Time Warner Inc

Buttress to basic cable Sports and Entertainment, Consolidate Cable News

Add to Mr. Murdoch’s empire

Charter Communication

Time Warner Cable

Aggregate Cable Subscribers

Had wanted all of TWC, had to settled for subs unwanted by Comcast


T-Mobile US

Consolidate Third and Fourth Carriers to achieve cost savings and bolster the subscriber base and acquire more spectrum.

Enforce price discipline in unstable oligopolistic market. T-Mobile has aggressively lowered contract pricing and switching costs to subscribers

Iliad, S.A

T-Mobile US

4th Place French Wireless Competitor looks for growth outside France: “US large and attractive Market”

4th Place French Wireless Competitor looks for growth outside France: “US is a  large and attractive Market” Also, a possible cost-effective way to gain a minority interest in a combined Sprint-T-Mobile US

EW Scripps Broadcast

The Journal Companies

Combine Newspaper/Group Broadcasters, then spin out Newspapers into a Newco.  Near-term cost savings will total about $35 million, as Scripps newspapers in 13 markets are combined with the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, and Scripps, while remaining controlled by its founding family, operates television and radio stations in 27 markets, up from 21.

Both local Newspapers and Broadcasters face withering revenue streams.

AMC Networks

BBC America

Take 50% Equity Investment in Standalone Network to give it more marketing clout with cable operators.

BBC under financial pressure at home. BBC America needs additional support which home BBC can’t provide

As usual, the publicly stated rationale for each deal seems to center on bromides (disputed heavily by bloggers) proposing to serve better subscribers’ or viewers’ interests; or, for the investment community, to enhance growth. By and large, however, it is clear that this round of consolidation is motivated either by a need to eliminate cost and/or to gain scale. It is an all-out race for dominance and for ever greater negotiating power. So, the question remains, why? Are we seeing further value being created or an industry cannibalizing itself?What are the common themes? In prior waves of consolidation, shareholders of both buyers and sellers tended to benefit (particularly in stock deals) as demand by advertisers and consumers for greater media choice fueled growth in fundamental measures-(e.g. subscriptions, advertising and revenue). Consolidation often, though not always, was further accompanied by increased efficiency and pushed higher margins in merged companies. This time, it seems, we don’t see significant growth opportunities, merely attempts to gain margin. Here are a few of the common themes we see in the current round: Seeking scale to combat fading growth or declines. Virtually every segment in the media industry faces declines in viewers, subscriptions, and advertising (arguably HBO is an exception). For some while, players have attempted to extract greater revenue per subscriber with rate or price increases. Cord cutting (either of cable TV services or landline telephone services) suggests that such strategies won’t work forever in the newly competitive media world. So, many of the above deals suggest a limit to further growth in penetration or usage and reflect an impulse to extract margin gains from more effective bargaining with suppliers or distributors. After both sides consolidate, however, everyone is back to point A and all face the prospect of further value erosion. A new round of capital expenditures on the horizon in both wireless and wired communications. Most existing cable and wireless infrastructure is obsolete. The set top box is evolving into a home gateway device. Network speeds average 15 megabytes down and 5 up on most systems but plant network speeds have already reached 1 gigabyte in markets like Austin. ATT, Time Warner, Verizon and Comcast are boosting networks speeds both upstream and downstream to well over 300 megabytes. Capital expense is rising rapidly to meet the new build requirements. A new escalation in programming expenditures will also siphon cash flow from programmers and content providers. Netflix, Amazon and Hulu video streaming services have had terrific early success in in creating and launching new programming, such as House of Cards and Orange is the New Black. As has been the case with every expansion in media choices, programming cost should rise as actors, producers and writers see their bargaining positions strengthen. Increasing demands by investors for dividends or incumbent entrepreneurial families looking to cash out through dividends or other financial structures. ATT and Verizon are dividend payers, which retirees or pension managers rely on, while Viacom, Cablevision and Comcast have incumbent entrepreneurs who need to cash out for state or other purposes. Where is the cash going to come from to pay out the legacy holders while competitive pressures demand higher cape ex and program investments? A willingness to try new tax reduction strategies. The Windstream Proposal shook the telecom and financial community when it announced that it is spinning off some of its network assets into an independent Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT), then leasing them back to remove a layer of federal tax liability. Partnerships to reduce tax liability have been used in the media industry before: Metromedia and the original Time Warner were good examples, but these vehicles tend to have a short shelf life as the IRS typically moves quickly to shut such loop holes. Like Master Limited Partnerships in other industries, such tax strategies are best employed in mature or declining industries. In the Windstream proposal we see an umbrella vehicle that can be used to liberate cash in future acquisitions, simply by bringing targets under the Windstream umbrella. Is there an urgent investment recommendation here? Not urgent, but cautionary. While scale and tax reduction may improve cash flow (or at least stem declines) in the short term for many of the proposed combinations, we doubt shareholders will benefit in the long term. Shareholders in a newly consolidated industry may have to look for other value creating vehicles outside traditional media players. When that happens, some player will be lift standing with no where to sit.

Tuesday, March 11, 2014

Sen Al Franken Takes Initial Strong Negative Position on Comcast TWC Merger

Sen Al Franken's position in this video suggests that approval of the CMCSA/ TWC is many months away, if ever. He says in the interview that CMCSA did not live up to the conditions upon which regulators approved the NBC Universal acquisition. Clearly, Franken is a part of one regulatory entity only--but he's an influential public voice.

Wednesday, February 19, 2014

Google is Attacking CMCSA, TWC Merger on the Bandwidth Front Before The Deal Closes. Expect Higher than Anticipated Capex by New CMCSA and Pressure on the Stock.

While many vaporous strategic initiatives float market ward shortly after major strategic deals announcements, this one deserves watching and has plausibility. We suggest investors watch for a possible a Comcast commitment to a 2 gigabit system wide (including Time Warner Cable) upgrade during regulatory scrutiny. It would be hard for investors to calculate the increased capital spending needed for the upgrade. The stock could come under pressure.

Media Executives Sound Off on TWC/ Comcast Deal

We're old school media institutionally ranked analysts. We want to know what you think about the TWC/CMCSA deal. Is it good or bad for the industry? Is it good or bad for your company? Do you think it will pass regulatory scrutiny? What do you think the regulators will want? What is the upside for consumers if any? What did you think of our proposal to require the new company to boost band width system width to 3 gigs in 5 years? Comment! Sound off! Let's hear from you!

Tuesday, February 18, 2014

How to Give Comcast What It Wants, Save the Consumer Some Money and Turbocharge Our Communications Infrastructure.

“Dare to be great.” A phrase which connoted both vision and hubris gained currency in the eighties and nineties but seemed to fade in the early 21st century. Well, not really as it turns out. Comcast’s recent agreement to acquire time Warner-- one that took most industry observers by surprise-- suggests that size is still a goal. Yet, the speech, however quietly whispered in corridors and cubicles of Comcasts new gleaming headquarters, still inspires fear among consumer advocates and regulators. They rightly demand to know what benefit there will be to society in concentrating thirty percent of the cable industry in one pair of corporate hands. With the concentration of wealth in even fewer hands, common sense suggests that the benefits of greater media industry concentration must be all the clearer and all the more compelling. Owners of property may, indeed, should dispose of their property as they see fit. In typical anti-trust policy, the argument against bigness comes down to: how high will prices rise and how much will supplies contract and investment be stifled. The argument for bigness is that innovation is spurred by concentration and that creative destruction of the old and replacement by the new occurs fastest in large enterprises. In media industries, however, the choice is all the more complex. These companies control what we hear and see through ownership of the news and information networks,the airwaves and the wires. In balancing the aspirations of owners, consumers and society as a whole and, it is not clear that bigness will produce a result that will benefit all. Time Warner Cable will have new owners soon. Nobody disputes the notion that Time Warner Cable needs change. Badly. Subscribers pay too much for services they don’t want. Customer service is weak. Outages plague the system. Internet speeds slow to a crawl late in the day. System infrastructure needs upgrading urgently. The stock has lagged. The same can be said for the entire industry. Average cable monthly bills before broadband have breached the $100 mark. Bundling of sports packages into consumers bills diverts too much of the consumer’s payment to the sports rights holders. There are too many cable networks, often with minute audiences, charging exorbitant fees. Subscribers continue to cut the cord. Internet broadband capacity has improved but at a snails pace. In an editorial in the NY Times, Paul Krugman points out that Comcast’s takeover of Time Warner Cable will give it even more power to increase susbscription rates to consumers, squeeze suppliers of programming and system equipment. Brian Roberts, Comcast’s CEO, on the other hand argues that Comcast market power will not further increase because Time Warner and Comcast do not overlap in any zip code. (Of course that is not the point, as Klugman argues, because municipalities license local monopolies-but never mind that.) Behind Krugman’s argument is that bigness-no matter who controls-should not be trusted. In our view Mr. Roberts can be trusted not to behave as an old time robber baron. In fact, his track record for over 30 years indicates that he and his company have always demonstrated the greatest allegiance to good corporate citizenship. But we recognize that the temptation towards monopolistic behavior is high with control of 30 percent of the national cable market. Frankly, the same can be said for Charter Communications, as guided by John Malone, who also has offered to merge with Time Warner Cable. So how about a new idea for whoever acquires Time Warner? How about transforming the media and communications industry completely with this deal? Here’s what we suggest: 1. Let Comcast or Charter or whomever acquire Time Warner Cable with the following two conditions. a) that buyer agree to eliminate the practice bundling of programming packages at the basic and enhanced basic level on his whole system. Instead, allow consumers to create their own packages and pay for the programming they actually want. This will shift subscriber demand for future communications services to be delivered through cable’s system. Even without a voluntary move by the industry to unbundle its services, unbundling will proceed in any event through expanded Netflix, YouTube or Amazon services. Cable could in our view possibly retain customers who would otherwise move to competitve services. b) that the new company agree to rebuild system architecture to 2 gigabits in download load capacity in 50% of their systems within 3 years and 100% in five years. Two gigabits is 133 times standard 15 megabits that Time Warner currently offers. With that much capacity converted to ultra high speed service, the acquisition potentially would engender a conversion to ultra high bandwidth service throughout the industry. The explosion in new capacity would benefit all: subscribers, shareholders and society in general. You say that’s crazy: that it will cost billions! We say maybe not. We believe that the capital cost-while high-is manageable, and could be driven far lower with a expansion on this scale than many would expect. Another major benefit is that new businesses would emerge in a tsunami of innovation that would follow and boosting growth right here in the USA. So we say to regulators, Brian Roberts, John Malone and the industry as a whole, let the industry “Dare to be great”, again. Light up your glass fiber with more speed, more services and new and innovative offerings consumers want. Take back your position in the communications industry and your destiny into your own hands.

Wednesday, January 2, 2013

When will the cable industry realize that its main business is in the provision of high speed internet access-not cable television?

Speedier Internet Rivals Push Past Cable -

Very, very important article: the substance of which is that the cable television industry feels no urgency to upgrade its distribution networks despite a clear threat from credible competitors.

What? The dismissal of demand for high-speed access makes no sense at all. Glenn Britt, President of Time Warner Cable, who I know and like very much, sounded foolish when he said there was no demand for higher-speed access. He's not alone. By 4 o'clock on a weekday afternoon Time Warner's Internet service slows to Manhattan like traffic speeds. Who does not want more bandwidth? More speed? Quicker access to social network sites, cloud storage, and video and audio services? While a 1 GB high-speed access service that Google provides in some markets seems like too much for most internet usage, it really reflects a huge threat to the bloated and over priced subscription based business model of the cable television industry.

Consumers are going to choose the highest possible Internet speed that is available-everything else being equal. Choice is better than no choice. Responsiveness is better than not. Consumers do not want to limit themselves to what is currently available. They will always want more. I understand why the industry does not want to be only a land-line high-speed access provider. The threat of becoming a common carrier exists. But the future lies in providing land-line ultra high speed digital service. It is really simple. So build it cable industry and clients will come.

The cable industry fears, rightly so, that the upgrade to their systems will cost billions. But what is involved in that upgrade? With fiber to the home already installed, systems can be upgraded by installing electronic encoders and decoders at required nodes (nodes are the points at which light pulses are converted to electrical signals). I am not saying that this will not cost money. It will, but not as much pulling out existing copper based coaxial cable. This type of cable is limited to handling 450 MHZ or .45 gigahertz signals.

At the same time, the cable industry is overpricing it's television service. The subscription model which requires basic subscribers to take many channels which they do not want at $70 per month or more is broken. My guess is that the many channels under the ESPN brand probably account for $30 per month in most cable bills. That's crazy. Similarly, for the MTV networks, the per month subscription fees buried in consumer bills are also larger than many know or would want. Many consumers would drop the "bundles" of services-especially those driven by sports rights costs-if they had the choice.

The best way to think about it it is to ask yourself what services do I use regularly? I use the news (take your pick), PBS once or twice a week, TCM a couple of nights a week and rarely HBO. I was interested in Homeland (Showtime) but my wife can't sleep after watching--ex asst district attorney. I will watch the NFL every couple of weeks during the regular season and some of the play-offs. But I also use networks, watch old series on DVD and occasionally, sleep. Also, I am on the internet all day long. In one form or another. I want ultra high speed now, but my two providers are Verizon and Optimum forcing me to spend over $100 a month on television services to get the fastest level of internet service. The notion that ESPN should be included in so called "basic" is insanely outmoded. Now is the time for, at minimum, broadly based a la carte programming offerings. The hit to the cable company and to the programmers might be significant, but a day will come when subscribers say enough. A day will come when Google has the muscle to go to the sports leagues and demand exclusivity and get it. When will it come? My guess within the decade.

The implications of vast expansion in internet access speed are enormous. It seems as if Google has already made a decision to become a major player in broadband, or at least, to so deeply scare existing operators into spending billions to upgrade to ultra high speed cable. Cable television companies, (Time Warner: TWX, Time Warner Cable: (TWC), Cablevision (CVC), Charter (CHTR), Comcast (CMCSA) face the decision to upgrade or to be over built by new competitors like Google. Netflix (NFLX) will try to stay in the game but very likely will need to sell itself to some larger entity. Vast new amounts of capital need to be spent. Vast new amounts to be raised. Hardware suppliers will compete for huge new contracts. Investment banks will exploit a renewed revenue stream from Cable industries upgrade or competitor fiber overbuilds. Cities will demand upgrades or revoke franchises and charge higher franchise fees. Satelitte providers will lose customers--certainly at the high end. It's disruptive--very disruptive.

Here's the article.
Speedier Internet Rivals Push Past Cable -

Tuesday, November 27, 2012

Apple Shares (APPL: NASDAQ: $586) Attractively Priced at Current Levels

Since early October, Apple Inc.'s (APPL) retrenchment from $705 per share to a current $586 has shaken the faith of many enthusiasts, and in some cases, shaken the enthusiasm for many participants for the market as a whole.

We think the shares are very attractive at current levels. We think the shares offer substantial upside without unrealistic projections of future growth. No doubt, the level of enthusiasm for the shares cooled for good reasons. To name three-- first, the prospect of higher capital gains tax rates provoked investor selling among those with substantial built in gains; two, Apple's "miss" in its latest quarter caused concern among investors accustomed to "beats"; and , three, weaker demand Europe and Asia for Apple products could lead to softer growth.

Based on current consensus estimates, we believe Apple is trading at the low end of its historic range. As you can see from the chart below, Apple P/E ratio on current earnings has declined asymptotically to about 11.6 times.

At current prices the shares are trading below their mid point p/e for the last two years. They are also trading below the SP 500 market multiple.

If the shares were to trade at the midpoint of both historic multiples 14.2 times (17.10 median) and median consensus estimates $49.75 upcoming year and and $57.95 for the following, then the shares should trade at between $800 and $850, and offer a +40% return, even before the current $2.65 dividend. So yes the shares look cheap.

What the multiple decline also suggests is that investors are assuming is a tremendous slow down in growth for revenues, contraction of margins and flat cash flow production: one which the earnings miss would seem to bear out. We have two thoughts. First, the shares have become such a large component of the Index (both price indices and market capitalization) that it is going to be difficult to establish much of a premium to the market because Apple has become the market. Secondly, it would be next to impossible to sustain the company's historic 5 year sales growth rate of 33.08% over the next five years. Of course it is ridiculous to projected growth of 33% going forward for Apple, isn't it? Yes, probably, but growth has y-o-y has seemed accelerate over the past five years. If it could, and it could also sustain its 40% gross margin and 30% operating margin then the shares are hugely undervalued.

Apple Year On Year Growth

2012 v 2011 44.58% 2011 v 2010 65.96% 2010 v 2009 52.02% 2009 v 2008 14.44%

Do we think Apple still has opportunities for growth? We are not technology experts. But yes it does clearly; the iPhone 5 is still a growth product; the company has shortened delievery delays sharply; and the product has yet to be introduced in many markets in Asia. Despite a toughening competitive landscape from many quarters in both the smart phone and table space (Samsung, Google, Motorola and possibly, Microsoft and RIM) Other Apple hardware products are still dominant and in early take-up in many markets. New Media products from the iTunes, music, movies, books, podcasts and apps. are still disrupting legacy media markets. Brand strength through strong design, reliability and m(mostly) virus free software continues to attract buyers while cash balances continue to build. (When these cash balances--now $30 per share net--a substantial amount of which is held by foreign subsidiaries, will be repatriated is going to be determined by upcoming changes in tax law and rates.) Under any tax regime Apple is building cash rapidly.

Apple shares are trading at under ten times projected year ahead earnings. If Apple share were to trade at their median PE ratio next year, the shares would have substantial upside.

Copyright Media Strategic Advisors, Inc. Not to be relied on for investing, trading, anything! How the model works is described on the You should read this page!

Monday, November 26, 2012

The MacDonald Media Model, is a very simplistic model that relies on data from MSN Investing, Yahoo Finance and Google Finance. They get their data from company reports and SEC filings and from the financial exchanges. We/I have been developing this model over the past two years. It uses tools and formulas from google docs sheets.

No-one should rely on this model for anything! It is the work of one person trying to create an investing framework for himself! I am sharing the analysis to get feedback and to see how far one can model future financial results for free!

I have no position in the shares discussed and may or may not initiate any position in the shares, at least until 5 business days have passed from the date of posting.

This is an overly simplistic approach because it is built around a given and arbitrary projection for sales. In Apple's case, the first I have published, I have slashed the historical growth in sales from a CAGR of 41% by 75% to slightly under 9%. As you can see Apple still has substantial value upside based on these projections of future growth in sales.

In another table, we compare projected earnings from the brokerage houses who write on the shares, against estimates based on our model and its simplistic extrapolation of prior five year results (modified) into the future. (For interest we added another type of projection based of the results of the prior quarter into the future. The latter is really a tangential point estimate and can be skewed by transitory factors: seasonality in results, weather, new product introductions. Etc.)

What is interesting in Apple's case is that the estimates from the brokerage houses and the extrapolation of five year results agree. Agreement means that one of two things: either that the future is predictable and consistent with the past and that could and should lead to higher earnings multiples or that the brokerages houses are not adding value and that their estimates are as mechanical as the projections my simplistic model has produced.

Here are the others:

Operating margins remain what they have been in the last two years. Uses of capital for inventory, receivables (net), plant and equipment are projected at the same ratio to sales as in the prior five years; in other words, days turnover for inventory remains the same as do average days for accounts payable and accounts receivables. Plant and equipment are added to support increased sales in the same ratio as the prior year.

Weighted average cost of capital is calculated on the daily rate of the two year treasury, the ratio of debt to total capital, beta as provided by Yahoo and projected growth in the market is the current year growth estimates provided by Standard's and Poors. I have made no provision for reinvestment of cash or acquisition activity by the company and presumed dilutive or accretive effect on results.

There will be errors in my work from time to time--I am just one person and do not hold out the quality of my proofreading for anyone to rely on.

Tuesday, November 13, 2012

Media Upside Down-Google the most powerful polling method, TV Land Reruns, a force among undecideds.

There were two (at least) fascinating articles about the decline in media effectiveness in the last election and  the titanic implications not just for electoral spending but for all media buyers.

In the first article, Nate Silver (gotta love him) highlights that Pollsters who relied on traditional landline telephone polling overestimated support for Romney and Republicans. Polls which relied on cellphones and/or online questionnaires seemed to favor Obama and the Democrats. During the course of the campaign these were dismissed as biased especially by the right. Silver argues that cellphone polls--which some firms are legally restricted from conducting, captured younger voters who often do have landlines by and large favored the President.  He noted that Gallup was particularly wrong and has been in the last three elections. Google which conducted on line questionnaires seemed to have the most accurate sample of likely voters and to reflect the final outcome. No doubt, many online respondents were more comfortable with the method and perhaps more truthful.

The second piece is even more fascinating: the Obama Campaign basically threw out the collective wisdom of decades of media ratings and buying. Gross ratings points, even traditional demographic measures were to the Obama campaign dumb and blind in reaching undecided voters. In a world of undecided voters, the key buys were Jimmy Fallon (NBC), Jimmy Kimmel (ABC) and reruns on TV Land network VIA.b), which apparently had no traditional ratings research to offer the campaign--maybe the lack there of made it more user friendly for non traditional users and viewers. Imagine if media buyers for consumer products, cars, electronics etc began to think the same way, the television grid would be upside down.

Oh wow.  Let me know your thoughts!

Thanks for Reading.

Which Polls Fared Best (and Worst) in the 2012 Presidential Race -

O Campaign Targeted Late Night, TV Rerun Undecideds

'via Blog this'

Thursday, November 8, 2012

A letter to my Republican friends.

Dear Republican friends.
Obama won. Ahhhh, a surprise, right? No need for panic. Your candidate was decent. He was not a McGovern. But party positions were wrong headed.  Really screwy even given the make-up of the voting population. The party needs to stop fighting history. If it can, then there is hope for the GOP. A return to a GOP which is moderate, in tune with history and responsible fiscally would be an attractive home to many Democrats and independents.  What would it take? Simply traditional republican values--frankly the positions Romney took towards the end of the debates.
I wish I could celebrate the victory of the party I voted for. It says extraordinary things about the country we live that we look past the color of a man's skin in electing leaders. But, it feels bad to vote for an administration which has done ok, barely, to vote for four years of modest improvements, but not enough and to wish for something more. Much more. And to have no option.
And I know that you, my Republican friends, are equally if not more frustrated, and desperately want to disengage from ball and chain positions: the evangelical movement, immigration, women's reproductive health rights, gay marriage, even the tea party mantra's of the slash and burn deregulatory cut backs and the repeal of Obamacare. A Republican party which does not move to embrace the social issues that propelled Obama to victory is a running against the tide of history in this country and is a disenfranchised and irrelevant party--and who wants to be irrelevant?
So, I would love to vote Republican. But I can't for the moment.
Anyway, let us hope that the failed Romney Ryan effort will lead to a political choice that voters in the center can embrace.
How about Susan Collins for President!
Your friend,

The 2012 Campaign A Highwater Mark in Media Spending Which Clearly Illustrates The Limits of Media Effectiveness.

Despite the threat of the fiscal cliff, the economy will continue to strengthen over the next year. That should help boost spending on advertising and other messaging for commercial products and services.  But the absence of the spending gusher from  political and pac reserves means that comparisons for media companies ((NWS, VIA, CBS, TWX, CMCSA, DIS, DISCA) will weaken, beginning now. After gorging at the political trough all year,  media companies are likely to report weaker financial comparisons beginning in the fourth calendar quarter. Disney has already indicated such an outlook on their quarterly conference call.

In media terms, the campaign of 2012 was a highwater campaign. Some $3 billion was spent all in media, $1 billion alone by the presidential campaigns according to the Washington Post (data from October 21.)  Pac Money was also exceptional at all levels.

This is an all time high, and does not include spending by individuals or organisations who were not required to disclose.  With this tremendous gusher of spending, the return on investment was basically zero--certainly for Republicans. While three presidential debates harvested enormous audiences (upwards of 60 viewers each across all covering networks), and probably influenced voting thinking for some days after they aired -- particularly the first debate-- the vast flood of negative advertising spending proved to be a fruitless investment for both PACs and candidates. For Democrats spending might be considered highly productive because it countered the Republican onslaught but was essentially defensive.

Arguably, spending on most negative ads boomeranged as well; the speaker/sponsor of the message being damaged more than its target. To point to one example, it seems to us that messages from the National Rifle Association picturing Romney/Ryan as strong supporters of second amendment rights may have energized the white male base and terrified everyone else. But in some sense, negative ads by Democrats to define Romney harshly also hurt Obama when Romney countered the picture painted by Democrats in the debate.

Despite fears of Democrats and others who believed elections could be bought, the benefits of such feral message making clearly did not materialize. We acknowledge, as Karl Rove said, that this election would not have been as close as it was without those messages from PACs and outsiders. But the PACs and other outsider groups ultimately made this election unwinnable.  With their many agendas, they locked Romney into losing positions and defined him in a worse light than the democrats could ever have. The ideology of the messages derailed Romney's candidacy precisely because ideology was more important to the message makers. Even worse, the external messaging will continue to antagonize blocs of voters critical to GOP fortunes  unless GOP leaders and campaigns get control of ideological entrepreneurs like Rove and his outside "allies".

Equally misplaced and distracting, was the confidence which message makers displayed in high level advertising. The bullying tone of many advertisements especially in swing states like Florida and Ohio antagonized and alienated audiences and had a counterproductive effect even among a supporters. Policy choices made by Obama in Ohio--especially to save the auto industry--outweighed and negated the messaging even to traditional Republican voters. Policy choices in other areas, like the Dream act, not to enforce deportation against people brought to the US by parents were galvanizing among immigrant voting blocks, could not be overcome by marketing or messaging and resulted in a decisive margin for Obama.

The amount money raised for and spent on media, also blinded the Romney campaign to the Obama emphasis on the ground game, organizing voter registration and turn out drives. Future democratic candidates will benefit from the vast supply of email addresses and names which were generated by this campaign. The Republicans are a long way behind in this area and losing ground. Both Republican and Democratic campaigns in the future will likely reallocate resources away from national advertising campaigns and towards highly targeted, precision messaging.

With poor comparisons, high multiples and few other catalysts on the horizon media companies should underperform the market.

Wednesday, October 31, 2012

Disney Buys Lucas Film: Good Deal, Dilutive Until 2015.

The purchase of LucasFilm, which includes Copyrights for Stars Wars, some (modest) producer share for the Indiana Jones series and the CGI, post production service businesses created by Lucas is a classic and sound strategic move in the media and entertainment world. Under the $2.0 billion in cash and 40 million shares deal, (currently$49.05 per share intraday), "Disney will acquire ownership of Lucasfilm, a leader in entertainment, innovation and technology, including its massively popular and "evergreen" Star Wars franchise and its operating businesses in live action film production, consumer products, animation, visual effects, and audio post production. Disney will also acquire the substantial portfolio of cutting-edge entertainment technologies. Lucasfilm, operates under the names Lucasfilm Ltd., LucasArts, Industrial Light & Magic, and Skywalker Sound." Why now? Frankly, Lucas Film is something that deal makers in the media world have had on their to do lists for decades. Presumably, there were two buyers for this property, Fox because it owns distribution for the Stars Wars franchise and Disney for its strong and increasing commitment to CGI production, and so-called Fantasy Films. For decades Lucas has kept the business under the tightest possible control, but presumably access to capital and estate planning concerns were best resolved by a sale to Disney now. Does the deal make sense? Did Disney over pay? Should Fox have stepped up. The usual investor questions right? Yes, yes and yes. Why did Disney walk away with the prize? Disney is a great company; management is highly regarded in the media and entertainment world; perhaps, only Comcast is as highly regarded these days as both Time Warner and Fox have had missteps. Time Warner's long term agony (AOL) would have certainly been an issue if there were strategic elements to support the sale to Time Warner. But, there were none. Fox has a strategic relationship with Lucas Film as distributor of the existing Stars Wars Films, but presumably, nothing else to warrant a deeper involvement. And, for someone like Lucas who wished to hand off his life work to a new generation of filmmakers the wiretapping scandal and criminal investigations in the UK was an additional negative. Disney also has the lowest cost of capital in the entertainment business--assuring Lucas that future films would get made. Disney was also prepared to create the most tax efficient structure for Lucas and to allow him to participate in some of the future upside of his new partnership with Disney. Is this an exciting acquisition for Disney? Yes, but long term. The good news is that Lucas Film is the real deal with properties which will produce income either in the form of (highly predictable) cash flow from existing properties (virtually existing Star Wars) or from (only slightly less predictable) new Star Wars productions. And seriously, New Stars Wars Films? These are going to be huge as long as the franchise is both managed and energized. At the same time income from merchandising is going to be bigger than from Disney's most Pixar and Marvel Acquisitions because they skew older and more male. Is there bad news: no, just less good news, according to the company's press release the acquisition will not be additive to earnings until 2015--meaning it will be dilutive to earnings until 2015-- when a new Star Wars is released. Does that mean that Disney overpaid for the property? Yes and no. It means that Disney paid more than anybody else was willing to pay--one must presumably. Is the purchase price of $4 billion too much compared to Marvel and Pixar? Hell, no! On a cash on cash return, the purchase price probably reflects some $300 million annual return to Disney before the benefits of new productions. That is just our guess but figure Lucas expects Disney to earn potential future profitability from the franchise. But those future pictures could each return what--$300 to $500 million in future cash proceeds? Maybe more, right? At the same time, the existing distribution deal with Fox is likely to be strained and to be less lucrative than it might have been without the sale as Fox has less incentive to spend money on marketing the films in existing distribution windows. We certainly expect Fox to window dress its ongoing relationship with Lucas Film but to leave most of the franchise building to the future beneficiary--Disney. One final point, does the acquisition of Lucas Film change the management balance at the company? Maybe. Kathleen Kennedy who is joining the company, is a very strong producer and could be a candidate for a wider role at the company as Iger is leaving in 2015, even though there is plenty of management depth at the company--in the Parks Division, Espn, ABC and so on. All in all an interesting, sound acquisition. I do not have a current position in Disney (DIS), but have had in the past and will likely do so in the future. I have no plans to acquire shares until the big macro questions--like the direction of monetary and fiscal policy--are resolved.